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1PREFACE
This paper discusses some problems in comparing estimates of national costs of
reducing emissions in order to mitigate climate change. The paper constitutes a part of
a NORCE-project funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that aims at
analysing the possibilities of achieving agreements on burden sharing of a common
action among OECD-countries to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. The other
contributions to the project are “Burden sharing in climate policy: Methods and
principles for the estimation of abatement costs” by Per 
Political Feasibility of burden sharing between OECD countries in climate
negotiations” by Leiv Lunde at FNI. I would like to thank Leiv Lunde, Per Schreiner
and Asbjørn Torvanger for valuable comments to the paper.
21 Introduction
UN's Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) recommends industrialized
countries to stabilize their emissions of greenhouse gases at the 1990-level. This is to
be understood as an advice, and is not binding in any sense. At a later stage of the
political climate process, those industrialized countries that have ratified the
Convention, may, however, be subject to binding commitments. In this perspective, the
cost of such commitments will have to be evaluated against the expected benefits from
reduced effects of global warming. From a single country’s point of view it is also of
vital interest  to compare their own contribution within an agreement with that of other
countries. This highlights the problem of urden-sharing.
This paper discusses some aspects of burden-sharing in the light of a widely accepted
point of departure, namely the "the polluter pays principle". This principle implies that
the burden on each country corresponds to their contribution to the problem of global
warming. It must be noted that the FCCC does not approve such a principle of burden-
sharing. The FCCC states that the industrialized countries have a main responsibility of
taking appropriate action to curb climate change. Therefore, the polluter pays principle
as a principle for burden-sharing may be a reasonable point of departure only within
the group of countries listed in Annex II of  the FCCC (OECD except Mexico).
The second strongly simplifying assumption we shall make is that the national targets
will be related to the emissions of carbon dioxide, only. We admit that this may
oversimplify the problem of burden-sharing, but it may be defended from the fact that
most of the economic literature about climate change till now has focused on the
control of CO2. From an economist’s point of view, this radically facilitates the
analysis, because the emissions then may be charged directly through some economic
activity, such as the consumption of gasoline. Within the context of this paper, it may
also be defended as a background for the discussion of several studies of the national
costs of climate policies (see Schr iner (1995))
Nevertheless, it turns out that a comparison of costs between nations is quite difficult.
Direct comparability requires an “ideal” world which we are far from are likely remain
3also in the future. On the other hand, it is clear that costs estimates based on
observations give indications of the burden for each nation if a common action is
agreed upon. A formal examination of cost measures may therefore be helpful in order
to say how representative an estimate over “climate costs” of one nation is, compared
with estimates for other nations. This paper identifies some aspects to be considered
for such an analysis, and discusses their importance. All countries that negotiate a
common action to mitigate climate change will be concerned about the importance of
these aspects from their own country. It is important to find a commmonapprach to be
applied for the parties for dealing with them.
The paper is organized along the following line of thought: On the basis of the
assumptions given above, a uniform carbon tax across all the participating countries
would provide a cost effective solution to the polluter pays principle if all the countries
were parts of a perfect competitive market. In a more realistic setting, it is more likely
that the parties will aim at an agreement of emission quotas. Alternatively, therefore,
one could allocate quotas according to the reduction of emissions from a uniform
carbon tax. Nevertheless, such an allocation would probably not meet the polluter pays
principle, and could be regarded as unfair for a number of reasons discussed in Section
2. The expected cost of measures taken to mitigate climate change could therefore
provide relevant information for the initial distribution of emission rights. Section 3
discusses the national cost of a climate measure. There are many alternative definitions
of this cost, and one cannot claim that one particular definition is the best one. Under
some simplifying assumptions, however, the net national product (NNP) may apply. It
turns out difficult, if not impossible, to arrive at a measure that is comparable between
nations. NNP will nevertheless be used as a reference for the discussion. In Section 4
we relax some of the assumptions about perfect competitive economies in order to
study optimal climate measures in “second-best” economies. It is shown that an
enforcement of the polluter pays principle in a strict meaning of the concept is not
possible. Conflicts between the aim of cost effectiveness and fairness may thereby
occur.
2  On the significance of national costs for the evaluation of burden
4The traditional economist’s answer to the problem of sharing the burden of a common
action to mitigate climate change is to levy a tax on the sources of the environmental
problem, in this case emissions of CO2. This is rather simple, namely charging the use
of fossile fuels for the emissions of carbon. In this section, we will concentrate on the
control of CO2, but will emphasise that the possibilities for controlling the problem of
global warming, and thereby the question of burden-sharing, goes beyond that. Other
gases contribute substantially to the concentration of greenhouse gases in the
atmosphere, such as CH4 and  N2O. Moreover, an alternative to emission reductions is
to enhance the sinks of CO2, for instance by afforestation, in order to decrease
atmospheric concentrations.
In order to attain a fair sharing of burden across countries, provided that CO2 is the
only subject to control, we will assume that a uniform carbon tax is introduced in all
the participating countries. Each government keeps the revenues from the tax and
redistribute them according to some optimality criterion. Although this rule does not
always lead to the first-best social optimum (see Hoel (1993)), we will refer to it as a
"fair" or ideal principle of burden-sharing. This interpretation is in accordance with the
polluter pays principle. Within this simple framework, therefore, there is no need to
worry about  the cost of the measure: Those who pay the most is those who pollute the
most, which is fair enough.
Under full certainty, there is a one to one relationship between a given carbon tax and
the quantity of reduction in emissions. As an alternative, therefore, the uniform tax may
be expressed in terms of reduced emissions in each country -  t e emission target. Then
emission permits could be distributed across countries according to the reductions
resulting from a uniform tax. There may be several reasons for expressing the target in
terms of permits rather than a uniform tax. One reason is that fos ile fuels are heavily
taxed in many countries for other reasons than the carbon emissions. These include
charges for other pollutants such as NOx and lead, and charges for road use (see
Section 4). It would therefore be difficult to control whether carbon tax imposed by an
agreement between many countries substituted previous taxes or actually added to the
system of previous taxes.
5Another reason, noted by Weitzman (1974), is that quantity control may be more
efficient than price control if the costs of mitigation are uncertain. Figure 1 illustrates
Weitzman's argument in a simple manner. Costs are measured along the vertical axis
and emission reductions along the horizontal axis. The costs of mitigation are
uncertain. They will either turn out low, in which case they are represented  by the C-
curve or they will  turn out high, according to the C*-curve.
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Figure 1. Quantity and price effects of control under uncertain costs.
Whether to impose charges or to use tradeable quotas in order to control the emissions
depends on the willingness to pay for emission reductions. A steep (inelastic) demand
curve for emission reductions (DA-curve) means that one is quite determined with
respect to the quantity to reduce, and is not so concerned about the cost of reducing
the emissions. A gently sloping (elastic) demand curve (DB-curve) means that the cost
of the target is rather decisive for how much to one would like to abate. In the latter
case, therefore, it is more important to keep track of the costs of the emission
reduction. A tax would therefore apply. In the former case the most important
objective is to reduce emissions, and quotas would be the most efficient. In the
diagram this is seen from the fact that an inelastic demand curve "transforms" the main
6part of the uncertainty to costs, wheras elastic demand mainly results in uncertain
emission reductions.
It is not straightforward to say whether the demand curve for reductions in the
emissions of CO2 is "elastic" or "inelastic". The answer will probably differ cross
countries, too. However, there are many indications that an international agreement on
common action to mitigate climate change will aim at assessing quotas rather than
common charges. Apart from the problem of controlling charges, it is a fact that the
OECD countries actually express their intentions regarding climate policy in quotas,
not in charges. Moreover, FCCC urges industrialized  countries to keep their future
emissions of greenhouse gases on a 1990 level, i.e. it relates to quotas.  Although this
is not a legally binding commitment for the signatory parties, it may be interpreted as a
signal about the formulation of such commitments in the future. In the context of this
paper, however, it sufficies to emphasise that there are good reasons to expect that
common actions across countries to mitigate climate change will include targets
expressed in quotas rather than in tax-levels.
In principle, therefore, a distribution of quotas according to the expected reduction of
emissions following a uniform carbon tax would meet reasonable requirements to
burden-sharing ("the polluter pays"). This applies, however, only within a perfect
competitive static world, which means that unless the negotiators have perfect
foresight, the distribution of emission-rights would have to be renegotiated
continuously. In a more realistic perspective, therefore, even a “perfect” initial
distribution of emission rights, would imply different constraints on different countries.
There are many reasons for this.1 Below, three important objectives are commented:
Future economic growth. The expected future rates of economic growth differ
considerably among nations. As emissions increases along with economic growth, the
anticipated abatement would have to be higher in countries with a high rate of growth
than in countries with a low rate. At the same time, the expected growth rate may be
                                                 
1 Clearly, these include the assumptions made in the Introduction, namely that the “polluter pays
principle”  should serve as the principle of burden-sharing, and that mitigation of climate change is
restricited to the emissions of CO2 .
7related to the present level of development. Many less developed countries are
expected to attain high economic growth compared with presently developed
economies. In that case the principle imposes a higher burden on less developed
countries, and thereby runs counter to an explicit requirement in the FCCC, namely
that industrialized countries have the main responsibility to take actions against global
warming. Also if one focuses Annex II countries of the FCCC (OECD except Mexico)
the same problem is likely to arise, because a similar pattern of economic growth and
living standard is expected between the rich and the less rich countries within this
region.
Economic structure. Different compositions of economic sectors cause differences in
emissions growth even if the general economic growth is the same. A fixed target
corresponding to the emissions in some base-year will encourage restructuring and
substitution towards less emission-intensive activities. Some countries may manage
such changes at rather low costs, for instance if one can continue production of the
same products by slightly changing technology. The changes will be more painful if a
more comprehensive and extensive restructuring of the economy is required. Such
changes may imply temporal unemployment and require that the country will have to
purchase additional emission rights.
Uncertainty. There is uncertainty as to how future national emissions will develop. As
the emissions are decisive for the level of abatement and for the future demand for
permits, the abatement  costs will also be uncertain. This uncertainty will cleary differ
between countries because the economic structure and thereby the energy intensities
differ and because secondary benefits of reductions in greenhouse gases, for instance
due to reductions in pollutants, vary. Thus, countries even at approximately the same
level of development, e.g. the OECD-countries, will have to adapt to different degrees
of uncertainty. The uncertainty cleary has a cost.
Even in its simplest form, therefore, emission permits cannot be distributed without a
comparison of national costs. The remainder of this paper discusses some of the
problems related to the assessment of the national costs of an emission target when the
aim is to compare burdens across countries. Unfortunately, it is not very conclusive.
8Etimates of national costs are nevertheless likely to be used in negotiations of burden-
sharing of a common target for a climate policy. Thus, we find it important to discuss
what kind of national characteristics that may be hidden in such estimates, and how
these characteristics may influence measurements of national costs differently.
Recall finally, that we have had a perfect competitive economy in mind when
discussing burden-sharing so far. This means that climate measures should be
undertaken where the costs are the lowest in a global sense in order to satisfy the
polluter pays principle. Thus, to minimize the cost of a quantity target, the country
subject to the target should not only seach for measures within its own borders, but
should also consider to finance measures in other countries. This is the idea of "joint
implementation'', which is mentioned explicitly in FCCC. As pointed out by Bohm
(1994), joint implementation can be regarded as a step towards a global regime of
tradeable permits. Tradeable permits implies that an initial emission target is levied on
each country. Under the fixed amount of total allowable emissions, each country may,
however, add to their own allowable target by buying permits or subtract from their
allowable target by selling permits at market prices.
Tradeable permits is a well-known solution to the problem of common properties, first
proposed by Gordon (1954) and Scott (1955) for the allocation of fishing rights. The
critical problem with tradeable permits is how to assess the initial distribution of
quotas. Since there are no legal authority for managing global problems, the parties
will have to agree on the distribution of initial emission permits. This is where the
problem of burden-sharing comes in. Each party will be concerned about their own
anticipated cost of keeping their target relative to the costs imposed on the other
parties.
3 The cost of a climate policy.
By costs, one usually refer to the price paid for a commodity or a service. Switching
energy use from coal to gas, for instance, requires investments. To a company,
therefore, the cost of such a switch includes the investment cost and the added cost of
9buying gas instead of coal. The cost at a national level may deviate from the cost at the
micro level. The fuel-switch implies less demand for coal and more for gas. This has
impacts on the profitability of the extracting activities, which again affects import and
export, the investments may replace other activities, and so forth. To assess the
national cost of such a switch, therefore, one needs to evaluate all direct and indirect
economic effects of the measure.
As illustrated in Box 1, the micro-approach (“bottom-up”) may give significantly
different estimates of the cost than the macro-approach (“top-down”). Since the "top-
down'' assessment aims at a description of the reallocations caused by a policy
measure, it should therefore be preferred for the estimation of national costs. In many
cases, it may be impossible to describe technical specifications of given measures
sufficiently within general macroeconomic models. In such cases, “bottom-up”
analyses provides necessary support to the “top-down”-models. The main conclusion
is, however, that the cost of the climate policy should be measured in terms of the
national cost, e.g. the change in the national product.
When speaking about the burden-sharing of a climate policy it is important, therefore,
to state when, if at all, a reduction in the national product can be interpreted as a cost.
Second, it should be analysed how comparable such losses in different countries are.
The immediate reaction would be that even to the individual who was only concerned
about material goods, a loss in the national product might be of less importance if the
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consumption level were sustained. Moreover, it is questionable whether a loss of
consumption is equivalent to the burden. This relates to the dispute about how able
economic theory is to explain welfare changes, see e.g. Sen (1979). The discussion is
clearly relevant in this context, but will not dealt with any further here. In other words,
Box 1  “Top-down” and “bottom-up”-assessment of climate costs
Figure 2 displays the production feasibilities for a country producing two different goods, x1 and x2.
The concave curve represents the maximum combinations of output, and shows the maximum
increase in the output of one good by a given reduction in the output of the other. Perfect market
equilibrium occurs at the point where relative price, pA is tangent to this curve, i.e. point A. Assume
that due to environmental concerns, x2 has to be reduced from x2
A to x2
B. One approach for assessing
the cost of this policy would be to value the physical change at present prices, i.e. pA (x2
A - x2
B). Th s is
often called the "bottom-up''-approach because one focuses the physical change on a micro level and
evaluates the cost as if prices were constant. The total national cost is arrived at by adding up the costs
of all changes evaluated at the micro level.
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Figure 2  "Top-down" and "Bottom-up" assessments of national costs
However, Figure 2 shows that if the national product is given at the point (x1
A, x2
B), it would be
possible to increase the production of x1 to x1
B, and maintain the environmental policy goal for the
production of x2. In other words, a "bottom-up'' assessment would exaggregate the national cost of the
environmental policy. This is demonstrated very clearly in Håkonsen and Mathiesen (1993). Many
bottom-up studies comes up with lower estimates then usual in top-down studies. This is, however,
due to different assumptions, e.g. about technological feasibilities.
However, it is far from evident that the economy approaches the curve again, rather than some point
between x1
A and x1
B after the tax has been imposed. This concerns the choice of measure, which we
will return to in the next section. In the meantime, it suffices to assume that the first-best solution is
arrived at in some way. The question is then in what way the value of the reallocation, or loss in the
national product, can be interpreted as the national cost. By reference to Figure 2, this loss can be
written as (x1
A + pA x2
A) - (x1
B + pB x2
B), where pA and pB denote the prices of x2 relative to x1 before
and after the reallocation.
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we take the point of view that changes in national economic figures give a sufficient
representation of welfare changes.
To restrict the scope of the discussion, therefore, we will concentrate on changes in
burden measured in terms of aggregate consumption. In a seminal article, Weitzman
(1976) showed that the net national product (NNP) had an intuitive interpretation of a
welfare measure, namely as the (hypothetical) constant level of consumption for an
infinite time horizon that would give the same total utility as the feasible future optimal
consumption path. Thereby, NNP represents an intertemporal aspect as well as an
arbitrary (conventional) welfare function of consumption. Weitzman emphasises that in
order to give NNP this interpretation, he national wealth must include everything of
relevance for production. This has lead Hartwick (1990) and Mäler (1991), among
others, to extend his result to include corrections of NNP for changes in the stock of
natural resources, as the conventional NNP makes no distinctions between rent from
the extraction of resources and the return on capital.
These extentions are due to the fact that the interpretation of NNP as a welfare
measure applies only if all the factors of relevance for production are included in the
concept of the macro production function. If an emission target represents a measure
taken to limit the future production feasibilities, it might also represent a (negative)
factor of production. However, for the NNP to measure the (constant) consumption
level that would be necessary to achieve the same total utility as the optimal feasible
consumption path, the factors that affect production have to be allocated over time in
order to maximize the present value of consumption. A target for the emissions will
usually not be a result of intertemporal optimization. The target will therefore imply a
restriction on the use of certain goods and services, which prohibits maximum welfare,
defined as the present value of a future consumption stream. Thus, welfare in this sense
cannot be defined by NNP, and conversely, a change in NNP cannot be interpreted as
the cost. Brekke (1994) makes this point by showing that Weitzman's interpretation
does not apply if public policy is time dependent. An emission target implies that policy
measures must be initiated dependent on the emission-sources, which become time-
dependent under the optimization.
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In addition, Asheim (1994) and Brekke (1994) points at several other conditions that
has to be fulfilled for NNP to represent a measure of welfare. The most important of
relevance for the discussion of burden-sharing are:
(i) The interpretation applies only for closed economies (Asheim (1992)). Open
economies are partly subject to exogenous prices. This means that the value of
the production in a country is determined also from the supply and demand in
countries with which they trade. Accordingly, the value of the production is
dependent on “exogenous” prices,2 and o is also the optimal allocation
between consumption, investment and trade. For the consumption-investment
ratio to be optimal in Weitzman’s model, the relative price between the two has
to be determined independent of exogenous prices. This is of particular
importance for small, open economies, such as the Norwegian. The effect on
NNP from a uniform carbon tax in all the OECD-countries, for instance, cannot
be analysed independent of the effects on the world energy market.
(ii) For the welfare interpretation to apply, NNP has to be measured in terms of
consumption units (as numeraire). Such a measure is usually not observed (see
Brekke (1994)). An approximation might be to deflate NNP by the consumer
price index. This is, however, highly unusual. NNP in real prices is usually
deflated by an overall price index for the gross national product (GNP). Thus,
if the investment prices increase compared to the consumption prices, the real
NNP deflated by conventional indices will be underestimated compared to the
appropriate welfare measure.
(iii) The NNP interpretation refers to the solution of an intertemporal
optimization of the consumption-saving decision. Thus, it requires that the tax
revenues are redistributed optimally in the economy, i.e. between consumption
and investments. This may, however, be a rather awkward task, and the optimal
redistribution will differ from country to country. Jorgenson and Wilcoxen
(1994) show that the measured loss in NNP as a result of a carbon tax is
13
critically dependent on how the revenues are redistributed. As an extreme case,
they examine the case where all the revenues of the carbon tax are put into
investments. This results in an increase in the NNP in the long run as a result of
the climate policy.
(iv) In countries where a large part of the economic activity originates from
extraction of non-renewable resources, the interpretation of the NNP is once
more problematic (Asheim (1992)), especially if the products from the
extraction are exported. Again, the welfare significance of the NNP is
weakened. An additional problem, of significant importance for Norway, is
how NNP actually is measured in the national accounts. Resource revenues can
be approximated as the revenues in excess of a normal remuneration on capital.
Aaheim (1994) shows that this is not to be interpreted as the income from
natural resources. Income should correspond to remuneration on the wealth of
natural resources, which is not estimated in the national accounts. For
resource-rich economies, therefore, the measured NNP may be far from the
welfare measure defined by Weitzman.
In other words, it is hard to find a justification for using NNP as an indicator for the
burden of a climate policy, even if the measures under consideration meet important
requirements for cost effectiveness. NNP (or rather GNP) is, nevertheless, the most
frequently used indicator for measuring the national cost of climate policy. Few will
disagree that the value of future consumption is a more appropriate measure of the
burden, although not a perfect one. In particular, it is difficult to defend a climate
policy at all if welfare depends on the consumption alone. One extention of Weitzman's
analysis, therefore, would be to include global warming in the welfare function to see
whether, and under what conditions, NNP still might apply as a welfare measure. For
practical purposes, such an extention would imply that one had to deal with the
aggregation of climate and consumption, which is difficult. It is therefore worthwhile
to analyse in what ways NNP differs from the welfare measure applied above as a point
of departure for studies of burden-sharing.
                                                                                                                                
2  Exogenous prices  are  prices that are independent of changes in one nation’s economy, such as
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The main question of interest is how and to what extent the burden, here defined as the
reduction in the value of future consumption resulting from a given policy measure,
differs between two countries that face the same loss of NNP as a result of a climate
policy. The discussion above indicates factors of importance, such as the openness of
the economy, inflation rates, the ability to impose cost efficient policy measures and
redistribute additional public revenues efficiently and the extent to which the economy
depends on natural resources. A more detailed analysis is required in order to estimate
how these factors affect different countries.
To conclude, we may say that NNP in itself has no immediate relevance for the
evaluation of the burden of a climate policy. However, a more appropriate measure,
the present value of an optimal consumption path into infinity, measured in
consumption units, is seldom available. Moreover, such a measure will also be subject
to discussion about the choice of a discount rate. Rather than calculating these values,
therefore, one may analyse the burden for different countries by studying how a
violation of the assumptions required for NNP to apply as a welfare measure affects
different countries.
4 The burden of emission charges
According to basic economic theory, the appropriate tax level to achieve a cost-
effective climate policy is equal to the marginal social "damage" of the externality. The
damage is the sum over the marginal individual disutilities of the externality. This tax is
usually called the Pigouvian tax, after Pigou (1920). It reflects the total social effect of
the externality. If the tax is not imposed, only the negligible individual effect of the
externality would be reflected in the market price, and the individuals would not have
any incentives to adjust their market behaviour in accordance with the social effects of
this behaviour. For instance, every car driver knows that he causes pollution and
enhanced risk for accidents, but he will not reduce these social impacts notably by
                                                                                                                                
prices which are determined in the world market. Oil prices provide an example for most countries.
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limiting his own driving. By embedding the social damage in the price of driving, the
Pigouvian tax enforces a socially optimal behaviour by the individual driver.
However, this illustration rests on some strong simplifications. It assumes that we can
start from a socially efficient point (the first-best solution) and end up in another
efficient point on the production possibility curve in Box 1. Moreover, the policy
instrument has only one task, to adjust for market distortions due to the externality in
question. For the result to apply as an advice in practical policy making, several
modifications of the model are necessary. Monopolies will obstruct the assumption of
the first-best solution, and the effect of the externality of an economic activity is quite
different from the utility of the commodity or service produced from the same activity.
Baumol (1972) showed, however, that "taken on its own grounds, the conclusions of
the Pigouvian taxes are, in fact, impeccable". In other words, externalities need not
change the character of the goods. It suffices to attach correct prices to them if one
can identify the externalities they cause.
Suggestions about higher taxes
are usually not popular, even if
the reasons for introducing them
are acceptable. This may have
several reasons. One is that
taxation of certain goods has an
effect on the income distribution.
Another reason is that the
government may be accused of
hidden motives, namely to
enhance the revenues rather than
trying to solve environmental
problems. In other words,
governments have a record, and
they have to take their total
revenues into account when
designing a policy of taxation. Furthermore, they are themselves monopolies and are
Box 2  “First-best” and “second-best”
For the production to increase from x1
A t  x1
B in Figure 2,
Box 1, the environmental authorities must initiate
appropriate measures. As pointed out in Box 1, the initial
point A was established because the relative price line pA
was tangent to the production possibility curve. From the
demand side, the combination of x1 and x2 is chosen at the
point where the welfare indifference curve is tangent to
the price line. From the figure it appears that the
maximum attainable welfare is achieved also in point A.
Equilibrium is thereby established. To bring the economy
down to point B the authorities need to face suppliers and
demanders with different prices, namely pB
 for the
suppliers and pC for the demanders. They can manage this
by imposing a tax on x2 equal to (pC - pB). The market
behaviour will then bring both supply and demand down
to point B, provided that the tax level is correct. In that
case, the required reduction in x2 is obtained together with
cost effectiveness, the “first-best” solution. These solutions
are usually unsuitable for practical advices. In most cases,
the economy is subject to several constraints not taken into
account in Figure 2. These constraints include social costs,
governmental budget constraints, etc. Optimization of
policy instruments under such constraints is often called
“second-best” solutions, and implies that a combination of
x1  and x2  on the production possibility curve is practically
infeasible.
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able to manipulate market prices and quantities to some extent. A first-best approach
to governmental policy is therefore usually inappropriate as a description of the
economy. In a realistic analysis of optimal policy it is necessary to include a broader set
of restricitions to policy making. This gives rise to theories of the second best (see Box
2).
Charges are paid for the use of fossile fuels in all OECD-countries. A carbon tax to
curb climate change will therefore add to existing fuel taxes, for instance charges for
road use. The question then arises by how much. Should the cost of the social damage
(the Pigouvian tax) simply be added to the previous taxes on fossile fuels, or should all
rates of fuel taxation have to be recalculated? Sandmo (1975) shows that an externality
tax, e.g. a carbon tax, may correctly be added to the previous taxes. A recalculation,
for instance in order to tax complementaries or subsidise alternatives, is not supported.
However, the optimal level of the carbon tax turns out to depend on the previous tax
system. The marginal cost of social “damage” constitutes only a part of the additive
term. The carbon tax will also depend on the marginal rate of substitution between
private and public income: The higher the marginal value of private income compared
with public income, the less is to be added because of the concern for carbon
emissions. On the other hand, one additional term of taxation occurs. This term
includes indirect taxes imposed for other reasons than carbon emissions, for instance to
collect revenues.  The second-best social price of  a commodity or a service with an
externality may therefore be written as:
Marginal production costs
+ Revenue taxes
+ Social disutility of carbon emissions adjusted for revenue effects.
= Social price
Newbery (1992) studies the case where gasoline is taxed to obtain revenues needed to
build and maintain roads in addition to the concern for carbon emissions. He gives an
intuitive explanation  of the adjustment of the additive carbon tax term. The aim of the
carbon tax is to reduce the demand for fuels. To the extent that this is the effect of the
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tax, also the revenues from other taxes previously charged fossile fuels are reduced.
This loss will have to be compensated by enhancing the carbon tax compared to the
Pigouvian tax.
Another important effect of externality taxes is thay they affect the income distribution.
Sandmo (1975) shows that if all individuals have equal preferences but differ in
productivity (i.e. their income differs), the total tax on fuels (revenue-motivated as well
as the carbon tax) will also depend on the income of those who contribute to fuel
consumption. This is rather intuitive when comparing with the above result, since it is
easy to accept that the marginal rate of substitution between private and governmental
income is dependent on the income. A high carbon tax may be compatible with a
moderate total fuel tax if the contribution to fuel consumption from low income groups
is high. This is because the elasticity of substitution between private and govermental
spending tends to be high for low incomes and low for high incomes. In this case,
therefore, a higher share of the total fuel tax should origin from the carbon tax term.
What are the implications of these results for burden-sharing of climate policy? In the
previous sections we have interpreted the loss in the NNP as a reference for the
evaluation of the burden. We have made no direct link to NNP here, but may take the
burden to be the reduction in NNP following a uniform carbon tax across countries.
We disregard uncertainty for the moment. Thus, the burden from an emission target
assessed from the emission reductions of a uniform carbon tax is equivalent to the
corresponding reduction in NNP. In order to interpret the results reported above in the
light of  burden-sharing, we first need to clarify how to understand a uniform carbon
tax. It was noted that the optimal carbon tax consists of two terms, one including the
Pigouvian tax (social “damage”), and one referring to the loss of governmental
revenues following the carbon tax. In order to be globally optimal, the uniform carbon
tax across countries has to refer to the “first-best” Pigouvian tax. Then, the burden of
the tax can be analysed in the light of the necessary change in the optimal total fuel tax
within different countries.  The compensation term will then vary across nations as
some nations need to compensate a higher govermental loss than others. This may for
instance apply to countries with relatively high expenses on roads and other modes of
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transportation. A uniform Pigouvian tax across nations will therefore tend to imply
heavier burdens on such countries.
One may negotiate a compensation for the differences in burdens by forcusing the
change in total fuel tax rather than the Pigouvian tax term. To equate the burden
among all the countries, the point of reference would be that the increase in the total
fuel tax was to be equal in all countries. Sandmo (1975) shows in this case that if high
income countries  contribute to a high share of fuel consumption and low-income
countries are most worried (suffer the most) about global warming, the change in the
total fuel tax would tend to be high and vice versa. Thus, with high-income "polluters"
and low-income  "pollutees", the introduction of a uniform increase in total taxes to
mitigate climate change would imply a relatively high burden on all countries. It is
usually assumed, however, that environmental concerns are given a higher weight the
higher the income is. A high share of fuel consumption in high-income countries would
therefore tend to exist along with a high concern for global warming. This moderates
the required increase in total fuel tax arising from a common target, because the
compensation-term in the additive carbon tax would be relatively low.
One important aspect of these results is that there is no sharp distinction between
"polluters" and "pollutees". As mentioned previously, one argument in favor of a
uniform carbon tax is that it meets some requirements for justice, namely that the
polluter pays. This argument is hereby weakened. However, a uniform Pigouvian tax
term can not be regarded as "fair", because some countries will have to compensate
more of its loss of revenues than others. In the second-best world, therefore, there may
be conflicts between the repects to fairness and cost effectiveness when trying to assess
emission quotas on the basis of uniform carbon taxes.
4  Conclusions
Before common action to curb climate change can be negotiatied, the participating
countries will be concerned about their own burden of an agreement. One reason is to
assure themselves that the action is worth the effort. Another is whether or not they
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have to pay a fair share of the total costs. Burden-sharing concerns the latter problem.
In this paper we have discussed burden-sharing from a highly simplified point of view,
namely that emissions of CO2 is the only  subject to control, that the burden can be
interpreted as the social economic cost, and that this cost should be distributed
according to the polluter pays principle. Ideally, the “fair” cost of a climate measure
could then be estimated as the reduction in NNP resulting from a uniform carbon tax.
Thus, one did not have to concern about the cost, it would suffice to agree on the level
of the uniform carbon tax.
Even from this simplified point of departure several problems related to burden-sharing
occur. One problem is that agreements are likely to be negotiated in terms of emission
quotas, not in terms of a tax. Except for highly stylized illustrations, it will be
impossible to set quotas that corresponds exactly to the reduction of a given tax.
Moreover, this “imperfection” is likely to increase over time. Thus, an evaluation of the
national cost of an agreement would still be of relevance, also for an examination of
burden-sharing. It is diffcult to establish a proper measure of national costs that is
comparable between nations. Rather than searching for the perfect measure, however,
one may use the conventional measures, e.g. the net national product, and analyse
properties of  the different economies in the light of a principle for burden-sharing.
If the national emission quotas are distributed according to the anticipated reduction in
emissions from a uniform carbon tax, the cost in terms of the resulting reduction in
NNP could serve as the “reference-burden”. In general, it is important to emphasise
that while costs measured in terms of NNP is derived from current observations, its
welfare interpretation relates to a problem of intertemporal optimization. Thus, if the
conditions for economic development embedded in the current economy changes, the
welfare interpretation of NNP no longer applies. For instance, the welfare effect of a
change in NNP in a small open economy may be significanly different the same change
in a closed economy. Thus, burden-sharing has to be considered in the light of how
open the economies of the participating countries are, and in what direction an
expected change in world markets will affect each economy.
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Observed national product in economies dependent on the extraction of natural
resources is often biased as an welfare-indicator, partly because NNP does not account
for the depreciation of natural resource stocks. A particular attention should therefore
be paid to oil exporting countries, because the effect of a limitation of the use of fossile
fuels has an effect on the income distribution between countries. What this implies for
burden-sharing is not discussed here, and will partly depend on how the burden should
be  distributed between consuming countries and producing countries. The income
distributional effect turns this into more than a question of the pulluters pay principle.
Moreover, it was shown that discrepances between the development of consumer price
indices and NNP-price indeces give rise to differences between changes in NNP and
welfare. This could, however, be chequed out rather easily.
To compare the burden of a common action to mitigate climate change, one should
also consider other costs or benefits incured by the climate measures. These include
secondary environmental benefits such as the reduction in pollutants resulting from
lower consumption of fossil fuels. Such effects may, however, also be related to the
effect on governmental revenues from a carbon tax. The carbon tax will affect the
revenues needed to maintain other public tasks related to the use of fossil fuels, such as
road maintanance. The need for compensation of this loss may differ considerably
between countries.
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